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The European Commission in the 21st Century  
Core Beliefs on EU Governance
Liesbet Hooghe
Abstract
What lives in the European Commission at the beginning of the 21st Century? This paper charts Commission 
officials’ views on the governance, ideological direction, and policy scope of the European Union, em-
ploying data from a large survey conducted in Autumn 2008. First, the Commission is not a hothouse for 
supranationalism. True, supporters of a supranational Union with the College of Commissioners as the 
government of Europe and member states in the back seat are the largest minority, but they are outnum-
bered two-to-one by state-centric, pragmatist, and ambivalent officials. There are striking differences in 
distribution by nationality, gender, and department. Second, where do Commission officials stand on ideol-
ogy? The answer is that the Commission is broadly representative of European societies, at least on tradi-
tional economic left/right issues, though decidedly more socio-liberal. Ideological views are not randomly 
distributed across services, with social DGs significantly more social-democratic than DGs handling market 
integration. Officials from new member states are more market-liberal than their ‘western’ colleagues. 
Finally, are Commission officials indeed bureau-maximizers? We find that, on the whole, Commission of-
ficials want more EU authority in the eleven policy areas that we asked them to evaluate, but their desire to 
centralize is selective and measured. It seems driven by functional imperatives – centralization where scale 
economies can be reaped – and by values and ideology rather than by a generalized preference for maximal 
Commission power. In short, the bureaucratic politics argument has been overstated. 
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1. Introduction1
Over the past few decades, the European Union has been transformed from a system for interstate col-
laboration to a polity (Hix 1994; Marks et al. 1996; Caporaso 1996; Börzel/Risse 2000; Hooghe/Marks 2009) 
in which Commission officials are active players. They initiate and implement EU decisions across a broad 
swath of policies, frame the European interest and represent the European Union in international fora. 
Their attitudes and beliefs help shape Europe’s future. This paper describes their views on the governance, 
ideological direction and policy scope of the European Union.2
There is considerable variation among Commission officials in how the balance of power among Commission, 
member states and European Parliament should look like. Differences range from supranationalism and 
state-centrism to institutional pragmatism. We begin by outlining these conceptions, show their relative 
strength in the Commission, and then examine to what extent territorial and functional factors help us 
understand variation in EU governance beliefs. In the next sections, we document ideological diversity 
among Commission officials and explore whether DGs have indeed recognizable partisan make-ups. In the 
final section, we examine which policies, and with how much, Commission officials desire to centralize or 
decentralize, and we take up the question whether bureaucratic politics motivates Commission officials’ 
beliefs on Europe’s policy agenda. 
2. Commission Officials and EU Governance
What form of EU governance is favored by Commission officials? What, in their view, is the appropriate 
balance of power among Commission, member states and European Parliament? There are several viable 
EU governance options: 
• An intergovernmental or state-centric Union which conceives the Commission as an agent under close 
member state supervision, i.e. member states steer the course of European integration (Moravcsik 
1998). 
1 I would like to thank the Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) “The Transformative Power of Europe”, the European Centre 
of Excellence at Chapel Hill, and the ERC grant # 249543_MLG. Several people provided comments on earlier ver-
sions, in particular Michael Bauer, Ben Crum, Renaud Dehousse, Morten Egeberg, Julia Langbein, Miriam Hartlapp, 
Hussein Kassim, Gary Marks, John Peterson, Christian Rauch, Thomas Risse, Jerome Schäfer, and Jarle Trondal. And 
most importantly, warm thanks to more than 2,000 Commission officials who took the time to answer questions in 
the online survey, or in one of the more than 200 face-to-face interviews. A revised version will be published as a 
chapter in Hussein Kassim, John Peterson, Liesbet Hooghe, Renaud Dehousse, Michael Bauer, Andrew Thompson, 
Sara Connolly, “The	European	Commission	in	Question” forthcoming with OUP. Early draft chapters were presented 
at a workshop organized in February 2011 at the KFG. All remaining errors or inconsistencies are the responsibility 
of the author.
2 This paper draws on data collected as part of ‘The European Commission in Question’, funded by the UK Economic 
and Social Research Council (grant no. RES-062-23-1188) and conducted by Michael Bauer, Renaud Dehousse, 
Liesbet Hooghe, Hussein Kassim (PI), John Peterson and Andrew Thompson. For further information, visit http://
www.uea.ac.uk/psi/research/EUCIQ. The online survey was administered by YouGov in September and October 
2008. A sample of 4,621 policy administrators was drawn from a population of over 14,000. The sample was 
stratified to ensure proportionality by gender, age and nationality; officials from the ten new member states were 
oversampled. The response rate was 41% (1901 responses). Iterative proportional fitting was used to create a 
weighted sample that reflects the population distributions by gender, age, nationality, and DG location.
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• A proto-federal or supranational European Union in which the Commission is the primary authority. 
This vision was theorized by early neofunctionalists (Lindberg/Scheingold 1970). Later work refined 
the argument by highlighting the role of the European Court of Justice as engine of integration and 
downplaying teleology (Sandholz/Stone Sweet 1998).
• A multilevel polity in which the Commission and the member states are interlocking and complemen-
tary institutions (Marks et al. 1996). This option echoes Ernst Haas, who observed in “The	Uniting	of	
Europe” that the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) constituted “a hybrid in which neither 
the federal nor the intergovernmental tendency has clearly triumphed” (Haas 1958: 526-7). He de-
scribed it as a fundamental departure from traditional conceptions of government. 
State-centrism has broad support in Europe’s publics and national elites, and since national loyalties and 
interests may influence Commission officials’ beliefs, some of these views are likely to carry over into 
the Commission. The supranational and multilevel options are in line with the general expectation that 
Commission officials favor strong European Union institutions. This is consistent with utility maximization, 
according to which bureaucrats are bureau-maximizing (Pollack 2003). It also jibes well with an organiza-
tional understanding of the European Commission, which expects their views to be shaped by organiza-
tional location (Egeberg 2001). And it corresponds with the observation that, given a choice, few individu-
als pursue careers in an organization with antithetical values.
Supporters of a federal Union or a multilevel polity find common ground in their defense of the Treaty 
rules that invests the Commission with the monopoly of legislative initiative and the member states (or 
the Council of Ministers) with the power to pass legislation. Haas (1958) drew attention to this institutional 
innovation in the ECSC Treaty, which became later known as the Community method (Wallace 2000; Weiler 
1991; Dehousse ed. forthcoming). 
The Community method has ambiguous constitutional implications. Commission President Walter Hallstein 
believed that it requires federalism (Hallstein 1963: 168). But Haas thought that the Community method 
was a stable equilibrium and so does apparently the Commission: “The Community method (…) provides a 
means to arbitrate between different interests by passing them through two successive filters: the general 
interest at the level of the Commission; and democratic representation, European and national, at the 
level of the Council and European Parliament, together the Union’s legislature” (Commission 2001: 8). 
When stripped of its federal ambition, the Community method side-steps institutional power struggles by 
regulating the separate roles of Commission and member states in policy making, and that is an attractive 
strategy for defenders of the Commission in a time of resurgent nationalism (Hooghe 2012). So the method 
has been linked with federalism and with multilevel governance. The Community method party is diverse 
indeed. 
Where do officials stand on these three options? Table 1 provides the distribution of responses on two 
statements concerning power relations between Commission and member states. There is considerable 
ambivalence. The first statement expresses the supranational view that ”the College of Commissioners 
should become the government of Europe.” As many Commission officials disagree as agree with the 
statement and 16 per cent sit on the fence. The state-centric statement that “member states – not the 
Commission or European Parliament – should be the central players in the European Union” produces a 
more uniform picture: 75 per cent oppose, though 20 per cent would not object.
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Table 1: EU Governance Views
Some people want the College 
of Commissioners to become the 
government of Europe.
Some argue that member states 
not the Commission or European 
Parliament – should be the central 
players in the European Union.
Strongly agree 7.4 1.1
Agree 29.9 7.1
Neither agree nor disagree 16.1 11.8
Disagree 26.2 40.7
Strongly disagree 13.5 34.3
Not	sure/missing 6.9 4.9
Note: Percentages; n=1846.
Figure	1:	EU	Governance	Options	and	Types	of	Commission	Officials
Note: N=1698. Five-point scales ranging from 1=strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3=neither disagree nor agree; 4=agree; 5= strongly agree.
Figure 1 typologizes Commission officials on EU governance based on their responses to these statements. 
Supranationalists agree that the College of Commissioners should be the government of Europe and dis-
agree that member states should remain the central pillars, while state-centrists disagree with the former 
and agree with the latter. But some officials – institutional pragmatists – believe that neither the College of 
Commissioners nor the member states should be the kernel of European government. 13.3 per cent can 
be classified as state-centrists, 36.6 per cent as supranationalists and 29.1 per cent as institutional pragma-
tists. One out of five officials cannot be placed into any of these categories. 
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Table 2 breaks these per centages down by rank, gender, and EU-12 vs. EU-15. The strongest difference runs 
along gender lines. Women are much less likely to be supranationalists. Interestingly, this echoes the find-
ing from public opinion studies that women are slightly more reluctant than men to embrace European in-
tegration (Gelleney & Anderson 2000; Nelsen/Guth 2000). Some have explained this in terms of economic 
interest: women are more vulnerable to economic competition and might be wary of the single market. 
Others emphasize cultural or biological differences: women are compassionate and less competitive and 
are more circumspect about power battles. This might explain why women are predisposed to institutional 
pragmatism. EU-12 officials are less likely to be supranationalist and more likely to not fall in any of these 
categories, although these differences wash out once we exert controls (see below). An official’s nationality, 
DG location, self-selection, and gender tell a more convincing story.
Table	2:	EU	Governance	Options	by	Seniority,	Gender,	and	Enlargement
Commission
(all)
Top 
officials
Rank 
and file
Men Women EU-15 
officials
EU-12 
officials
Supranationalists
State-Centrists
Institutional Pragmatists
Other
36.6
13.3
29.1
21.0
39.5*
9.2*
29.4
21.8
36.1*
13.5*
28.7
21.7
40.4**
12.0*
27.2*
20.4
29.8**
15.8*
32.6*
21.8
38.8**
12.8
28.9
19.5*
30.4**
14.7
29.7
25.2*
N 1692 119 1498 1068 614 1278 401
Note: Percentages. * indicates that differences of means is significant at .05 level and ** at .01 level between subgroups, e.g. men are 
significantly more likely to be supranationalists than women, and EU-15 officials are more likely to be supranationalists than EU-12.
There is much that unites supranationalists, state-centrists, and institutional pragmatists. They tend to 
agree that a) the Commission should not focus on managing existing policies; b) posts in the Commission 
should not be distributed by c) officials should put loyalty to the Commission over DG loyalty. Table 3 shows 
that for each of the six statements, absolute majorities in three categories endorse the same direction. But 
three differences stand out. 
First, state-centrists are less opposed than others to the Commission focusing more on management than 
on initiation (statement I). Second, while there is limited support across the Commission for sharing its 
initiative with the European Parliament, state-centrists are most skeptical and supranationalists least skep-
tical (statement III). The Commission’s monopoly of initiative is the alpha and omega of the Commission’s 
separate-but-equal role in the European Union’s system of multilevel governance. Interestingly, it is not a 
breakpoint for a supranationalist/federalist who sets his eyes on the Commission governing Europe. Third, 
state-centrists and institutional pragmatists are much less concerned about accommodating national inter-
ests, be this through “geographical balancing” or by tolerating one Commissioner per member state, than 
supranationalists, who are strongly opposed (statement IV and V). 
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Table	3:	Attitudes	By	EU	Governance	Type	
Percentage who agree strongly or tend to agree
State 
centrists
Institutional 
pragmatists
Supra-
nationalists
Commission as Manager vs. Commission as Initiator
I. The Commission should primarily focus on managing existing policies 
rather than developing new ones.
24.8 12.0 10.0
II. The more member states the EU has, the more important is the 
Commission’s role as policy initiator.
63.1 69.0 65.6
III. The Commission should share its sole right of initiative with the 
European Parliament.
29.8 32.1 37.6
Accommodate national interests vs. independent of national interest
IV. Some argue that posts in the Commission should be distributed on 
the basis of geographical balance.
41.3 37.1 34.2
V. It is more important to have one Commissioner per member state 
than to have a smaller and more efficient College.
36.8 32.0 20.2
Loyalty to DG vs. Loyalty to Commission
VI. Commission officials work for their DG first, then for the 
Commission.
42.0 29.8 29.2
Note: Percentage of respondents agreeing strongly or tending to agree with the statement (as opposed to disagreeing strongly or 
tending to disagree or neither agreeing nor disagreeing).
2.1 Explaining Beliefs on EU Governance
What makes someone a supranationalist, state-centrist, or institutional pragmatist? Past research suggests 
that territorial and functional (or professional) loyalties and interests shape EU governance views among 
European elites (Egeberg 2001; Hooghe 2002, 2005; Beyers 2005; Bauer 2008; Hooghe 2012). Our analysis 
provides strong support for these conjectures, but we also find that other factors, in particular the reason 
for joining the Commission (motivation) and gender, help explain EU governance views. 
Figure 2 suggests there are considerable differences among nationalities in the distribution of suprana-
tionalists, institutional pragmatists and state-centrists. Belgians and Italians are heavily overrepresented 
among supranationalists; state-centrists come disproportionately from Britain, Slovakia, and Sweden, and 
institutional pragmatists from Portugal, Slovenia, and the Netherlands. Four national characteristics in 
particular predispose nationalities to state-centrism, supranationalism, or institutional pragmatism: 
Multilevel governance. • Supranationalists and institutional pragmatists come disproportionately from 
countries with extensive decentralization and state-centrists come disproportionately from unitary 
countries.3
3 Operationalized as the average score on the Regional Authority Index for each member state over ten years (1995-
2006), a measure of the extent of self rule and shared rule for each intermediate tier of regional government. 
Source: RAI dataset by Hooghe et al. (2010), accessible on http://www.unc.edu/~hooghe. The difference is signifi-
cant at 0.001 level between state-centrists and supranationalists; institutional pragmatists rank in between.
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Religion and state building.•  State-centrists come disproportionately from protestant countries; supra-
nationalists and institutional pragmatists from catholic countries.4 There is congruence here with the 
finding in European public opinion research that support for supranationalism tends to be strongest 
in Catholic societies (Nelsen et al. 2001; Madeley 2008; Boomgaarden/Freire 2009). Stein Rokkan em-
phasized how religious strife split Europe into territories that rejected Rome and those that embraced 
it. Protestant state churches became central instruments for nation builders in Northern and Central 
Europe, whereas the Catholic Church remained supranational (Rokkan/Urwin 1983). 
Country size. • State-centrists come disproportionately from large countries; supranationalists from 
smaller countries. This is consistent with the expectation that the smaller the country, the greater the 
benefits of large-scale European government. 
Governance efficacy. • State-centrists and institutional pragmatists come disproportionally from coun-
tries with effective governance; supranationalists from less effective governance countries. Substituting 
a federal European government for national government is attractive if the latter cannot produce the 
public goods.5
4 Operationalized as the percentage of protestant respectively catholic population for each member state in 2008; 
standardized around the mean. Source: US State Department‘s International Religious Freedom Report 2008 (ac-
cessible from http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/). Difference of means between state-centrists on the one hand 
and institutional pragmatists and supranationalist on the other is significant at the 0.001 level.
5 Government effectiveness is a measure developed by the Worldwide Governance Indicators Program of the 
Worldbank. These aggregate indicators are based on hundreds of variables measuring various dimensions of 
governance, taken from 35 data sources provided by 33 different organizations. The data reflect the views on 
governance of public sector, private sector, and NGO experts, public opinion and firm surveys. Source: Kaufmann 
et al. (2009) (accessible from the Worldbank http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp). Differences 
between state-centrists and institutional pragmatists on the one hand and supranationalists on the other are 
significant at the 0.001 level.
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Figure	2:	EU	Governance	Types	and	Nationality	
Attitudes differ also systematically across Directorate Generals (DGs), but the differences are not as pro-
nounced as for nationality. One finding and one non-finding deserve highlighting:
Technical expertise DGs. • Institutional pragmatists work disproportionately in DGs with technical 
content; state-centrists and supranationalists in DGs with political content. Where shared technical 
know-how is a basis for effective policy making, institutional power battles are irrelevant. Institutional 
pragmatists are overrepresented in DGs such as Fisheries, Environment, Development, or Information 
Society. Our data do not enable us to tease out whether this is because institutional pragmatists self-
select (or are recruited) for technical DGs, or because the policy environment socializes and incentiv-
izes people who work there. 
DGs with strong legal competence. • Officials in DGs that exercise monopoly of Commission initiative 
do not house a disproportionately large number of supranationalists, and DGs with extensive routin-
ized member state involvement do not have more state-centrists. We tested this in terms of socializa-
tion as well as utility. To the extent that DG experience shapes attitudes, one might have expected 
otherwise. However, the data do not bear this out. 
Territorial loyalty and DG experience explain the bulk of the variance in EU governance views, but three 
additional factors merit mention. 
National administration• . Commission officials who worked in a national administration or as diplo-
mat prior to joining the Commission are significantly more likely to be state-centrists and less likely 
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to be supranationalists. This is consistent with earlier work (Hooghe 2002), and it conforms to the 
expectation that former national bureaucrats export state-centered views acquired at home to their 
new job.
Motivation for joining the Commission. • Respondents who joined because of a commitment to Europe 
are more likely to be supranationalists or institutional pragmatists and less likely to be state-centrists. 
Commitment to Europe is the most common motivation – 72 per cent mention it, but only 57 per 
cent of state-centrists do against 80 per cent of supranationalists and 69 per cent of institutional prag-
matists. 23 per cent mention commitment to a policy, and supranationalists are underrepresented 
and institutional pragmatists overrepresented. Interestingly, institutional pragmatists are also over-
represented among those who were asked to apply, and among those who say they joined because 
they like to work in an international environment, or because of personal or family reasons – reasons 
noticable for being non-committal on the institutional power balance between Commission and mem-
ber states.6
Gender. • As indicated above, women are significantly more likely to be institutional pragmatists or 
state-centrists, and less likely to be supranationalists. The EU governance gender gap is most pro-
nounced in the EU-15. 
These patterns are robust in multivariate analysis.7 National background is powerful in distinguishing state-
centrists from supranationalists, while DG location helps explain who are the institutional pragmatists. 
State-centrists are most likely to come from countries with limited multilevel governance, countries with 
larger populations, and from Protestant countries. Supranationalists come from countries with multilevel 
governance, smaller countries, countries with less governance effectiveness, and non-Protestant countries. 
State-centrists and supranationalists are thus mirror images. Institutional pragmatists stand apart from 
both groups – not so much in terms of where they come from, but on account of their professional profile: 
they tend to work in policy DGs with high technical content where shared technical knowledge reduces 
institutional power struggles.8 Their motivational core is consistent. They came to Brussels for primarily 
a-political reasons: to work on a policy problem they care about, to be in an international environment, or 
because family or circumstance brought them there. 
2.2 Beliefs about the Future
In separate interviews with senior managers and heads of unit, we presented respondents with three 
conceptions of the European Commission’s role in EU governance. 
The Commission as policy initiator and guardian of the treaties • 
The Commission as an administration serving the Council and the Parliament • 
The Commission as the government of Europe• 
6 These last three differences are not statistically significant because of the small number of officials involved.
7 See Hooghe (2012) for a detailed analysis.
8 Dichotomous variable taking on the value of 1 if a respondent works in a policy DG that demands above average 
technical expertise, i.e. agriculture, development, environment, EuropeAid, fisheries, information society and me-
dia, internal market, joint research centre, taxation, and customs union. Differences between institutional pragma-
tists and state-centrists are significant at 0.05 level and at 0.10 level with supranationalists.
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These conceptions are not directly comparable to the governance types sketched above, but there are 
affinities. The first option describes the Community method, the second option is consistent with state-
centrism or intergovernmentalism, and the third comes closest to Hallstein’s federal conception. 
Figure	3:	Preferences	and	Expectations	about	the	Commission’s	Role
Source: Face-to-face interviews with heads of unit and senior managers (n=119).
We asked which of these three conceptions of the Commission do respondents prefer, and which of these 
will the Commission be closest to ten years from now? Figure 3 reveals a sharp distinction between desires 
and expectations. Eighty-one per cent prefer the Community method, but only 43 per cent believe it will 
survive beyond ten years. Eight per cent support the federal conception, but only 2.5 per cent see this as 
the Commission’s future. The sharpest contrast is on the Commission as administration: just 1 per cent 
supports this, but 21 per cent expect this to be the Commission’s future.9 There is a grim realization among 
senior officials that the role of the Commission is changing in an undesirable direction and over which they 
have little control. 
9 A large number of interviewees did not respond to the second question. When these missing values are ex-
cluded the numbers change to 56 per cent (Community method), 27.5 per cent (administration), and 3.3 per cent 
(government).
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3. Commission Officials and Politics
Scholars, politicians, and media pundits attribute ideological bias to Commission bureaucrats, though 
there is little agreement on the direction of this bias. A broad strand of the political economy literature 
understands the European Union as an agent of big capital (van Apeldoorn et al. 2009). This is consistent 
with the purported bias of the Treaty in favor of market integration (Scharpf 2010). Ironically, many politi-
cians and political pundits blame the European Commission for exactly the reverse. In 1988, British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher famously accused the Delors Commission of plotting socialism through the 
backdoor. Vaclav Klaus, the Czech president, contemptuously describes the Commission as socialist. We 
therefore venture into highly charged political terrain when we poll Commission officials on their economic 
and social-cultural philosophy: 
“People often think of themselves in terms of their personal philosophical stance on economic issues. • 
Some favour an active role for government on economic policy questions. Others look primarily to 
markets. Where would you place yourself in terms of economic philosophy?” ranging from 0 (a greater 
role for government) over 5 (centrist) to 10 (greater role for markets). 
“People often think of themselves in terms of their personal philosophical stance on social and cultural • 
issues. Many people who consider themselves to be liberal tend to favour expanded personal free-
doms on (for example) abortion, same-sex marriage, and so on. People on the conservative side tend 
to favour more traditional notions of family, morality, and order. Where would you place yourself in 
terms of social-cultural philosophy?” ranging from 0 (more liberal) to 10 (more conservative). 
Table 4 presents these dimensions on 0 (left) to 10 (right) scales. On the economic left/right, European 
Commission officials are centrist, leaning slightly to the right (mean=5.47). On the social liberal/conserva-
tive dimension, Commission officials are left of center (mean= 3.68). Variation on social values is greater 
than on economic values. 
Table	4:	Ideology	by	Seniority,	Gender,	and	Enlargement
Commission Top 
officials
Rank 
and file
Men Women EU-15 EU-12 Political 
Parties 
EU-15
Political 
Parties 
EU-12
Economic left/right dimension
Mean 5.47 5.45 5.47 5.48 5.44 5.19** 6.27** 5.10 4.99
Median 5.00 6.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 7.00 5.00 4.70
St.Dev. 1.98 2.13 1.97 2.02 1.92 1.93 1.91 2.07 2.10
N 1676 122 1555 1060 616 1248 428 114 73
Social-cultural dimension
Mean 3.68 3.51 3.69 3.72 3.61 3.53** 4.13** 5.66 5.08
Median 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 5.75 5.00
St.Dev. 2.49 2.45 2.50 2.45 2.57 2.37 2.77 2.00 2.15
N 1676 122 1555 1060 610 1248 428 114 73
Note: ** indicates that differences of means are significant between subgroups at p<.01. EU-12 political parties are to the economic 
left of EU-12 Commission officials and the difference is statistically significant; officials of either part of Europe are significantly more 
socially liberal than are political parties.
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One of the most striking findings in the survey is evident from the last four columns in Table 4. EU-12 
officials are considerably more rightwing and less social-liberal than their EU-15 colleagues.10 Both dif-
ferences are highly significant. Moreover, EU-12 officials are quite a bit more pro-market than political 
parties in their home countries. They are also more socially liberal. EU-12 officials are not representative of 
their societies. They are mobile, Western-educated, have tenuous ties to communist networks, tend to be 
outspoken critics of the former regime, and are usually successfully integrated in the “Western” world. As 
a result, they are motivated to embrace market values and cosmopolitanism, often with the zeal of recent 
converts. One might have expected differently. A compelling line of argument, developed by Kitschelt et 
al. (1999) and Vachudova (2005), is that the revolutions left a communist legacy – radical economic egali-
tarianism and anti-democratic authoritarianism – that continues to shape values and political preferences. 
EU-12 officials might have been to the economic left and more socially conservative than their EU-15 
counterparts. We find signs of somewhat greater conservativism, but quite a bit more market liberalism 
than among their Western colleagues. 
3.1	 Understanding	Ideological	Variation	in	the	Commission
Ideology is prior to Commission employment. Whether a person is a market liberal rather than a so-
cial democrat or liberal rather than conservative is determined earlier in life.11 Explaining the origins of 
Commission officials’ ideological beliefs is therefore beyond the scope of this study, but perhaps the data 
can shed light on ideological variation in the Commission. Let us examine three sources of variation: terri-
tory, DG location, and EU governance views.
10 It is well documented that the ideological profile of parties in the older member states of Western Europe differs 
considerably from most recent member states (Marks et al. 2006). That is why we compare officials from the EU-15 
with EU-15 political parties and officials from the EU-12 with EU-12 political parties. The political party positioning 
for a country is the average of political parties weighted for party vote in the national election in or prior to 2006. 
Source: 2006 Chapel Expert survey on political parties (Hooghe et al. 2010).
11 Though it is possible that ideological priors could be affected by experiences in the Commission. About potential 
genetic bases for ideological proclivities, see Alford et al. (2005).
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Figure	4:	Ideology	by	Nationality
Note: N=1676, with N=>18 or higher for each nationality (Luxembourg excluded). The bars represent the mean value by nationality, 
and the whiskers the 95 per cent confidence intervals. Darker- and lighter colored bars at either end highlight which nationalities 
have ideologies that differ significantly from the overall average (one-tailed t-tests at p<0.05).
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National political economy and economic ideology. Figure 4 illustrates average positioning on the eco-
nomic left/right by nationality. There is a left-oriented Southern cluster and an economically liberal Central 
and Eastern European cluster. However, there is no Scandinavian cluster and, interestingly, officials from 
“market-liberal” Britain stand shoulder to shoulder with “Rhine-capitalist” Germans and Dutch. Hence 
our findings only partly confirm the expectation that nationalities upload their country’s political-eco-
nomic model: that Brits make the case for market liberalism, Germans and French for Rhine capitalism, 
Scandinavians for social democracy, and Southerners for a Mediterranean model oriented around the fam-
ily (Brinegar/Jolly 2005; Callaghan 2010). As noted above, the difference between EU-12 officials and EU-15 
officials trumps that between any smaller country groupings, but that difference cannot be attributed to 
divergent national socialization. The reasons why EU-12 officials are more market-liberal than their EU-15 
colleagues appear to be personal rather than national.
Policy families and economic ideology. Officials in market-correcting DGs, such as regional policy, so-
cial policy, or environment, are less pro-market than those in market-enhancing DGs, such as trade or 
competition (Table 5). This corresponds with scholarly accounts that highlight how key Commission ser-
vices are dominated by particular ideological factions. Wilks (2005) shows that neoliberalism among DG 
Competition officials provided a major impetus for enhanced EU authority in competition policy (see also 
Wigger/Nölke 2007). Ross (1995), Hooghe (1996), and Falkner (1998) have documented how particular 
Commission services have been motivated by social-democratic ideas regarding EU cohesion and social 
policy. Students of EU gender and anti-discrimination policy describe how the Commission services have 
pushed a progressive agenda (Chicowski 2007; Caporaso/Tarrow 2009). 
DG core activity and ideology. A more general pattern of ideological sorting emerges when one coalesces 
DGs according to their core activity.12 Economically left officials are overrepresented in spending DGs, while 
economically rightwing officials are found disproportionately in regulatory DGs. Regulatory DGs are also 
distinctly more conservative, while officials in external relations – and surprisingly, also internal DGs such 
as the Secretary General, Administration or the Legal Services – are more socially liberal. 
EU governance views. State-centrists are to the economic right of supranationalists, and institutional 
pragmatists.13 This is consistent with the notion that the right favors intergovernmentalism to create re-
gime competition, while the left favors supranationalism to increase the EU’s capacity to regulate markets 
(Hooghe/Marks 1999). One might also expect officials with socially liberal views to be more supportive of 
European authority and conservative individuals to be less supportive (Inglehart 1970; Marks et al. 2006; 
Risse 2010). But Table 5 shows that the difference is not statistically significant.
12 A DG is allocated to one of five categories (regulatory, legislative, spending, internal, external) if it is primarily or 
secondarily involved in this activity. DG activity is assessed on the basis of the Commission’s Annual Management 
Reports, in which each DG explains its functions and activities and sets out its budget.
13 Difference of means tests for economic philosophy between state-centrists on the one hand and institutional 
pragmatists and supranationalists on the other hand are significant at the 0.001 level; on socio-cultural philosophy 
means are different at the 0.05 level. Institutional pragmatists and supranationalists are not significantly different 
in their ideology.
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Table	5:	DG	Location	and	Ideology
Economic left/right Social liberal/conservative
All DGs Mean = 5.47 Mean = 3.68
Market-enhancing DGs
Market-correcting DGs
Strongly more to the right
Strongly more to the left
6.02 (.000)
5.02 (.000)
―
―
3.76 (.411)
3.55 (.215)
Spending DGs
Regulatory DGs
Legislative DGs
Internal DGs
External DGs
Strongly more to the left 
Strongly more to the right 
―
―
―
5.08 (.000)
5.83 (.000)
5.35 (.404)
5.35 (.221)
5.44 (.786)
―
Strongly more conservative
―
More liberal
More liberal
3.62 (.789)
3.96 (.005)
3.55 (.586)
3.40 (.049)
3.28 (.041)
Note: Figures in brackets report p-values of t-tests on whether the mean for officials in a DG group is significantly different from the 
mean for officials outside the DG group.
Policy making concerns the allocation of values. The values that the Commission allocates vary from policy 
to policy, and – strikingly – the values that the employees in those policy fields behold vary in tandem. 
Market-correcting DGs attract officials sympathetic to an active, equilibrating role for government on eco-
nomic questions, and market-enhancing DGs appeal to market liberals. Services that disburse money ap-
peal more to social-democrats, and regulatory services are more economically conservative. On economic 
ideology, DG location is a surer predictor than nationality. There is only one exception: the ideological 
difference between EU-12 and the EU-15 officials.
Interpersonal variation on the socio-cultural dimension – though greater – is less easily understood. This 
study confirms that officials are considerably more socially liberal than citizens, but that is to be expected 
given their advanced education, public sector profession, person-oriented work with a high degree of 
control over pace and content, international life style, and high income (Kitschelt 1994; Oesch 2006). 
Social-cultural values cluster only in a very minor way by DG group: external DGs draw more social liber-
als, and regulatory DGs attract more conservatives. Nor do they differ significantly between top and rank, 
between individuals with a lot or a little multinational experience, or by EU governance type. What appears 
to explain variation on socio-cultural values is the same set of factors at work in the general population: 
social conservatives are overrepresented among EU-12 officials, older officials, officials from non-prot-
estant countries, and among right-of-center officials. There are very few indications that the European 
Commission or the EU political context influence ideological positioning on socio-cultural values. 
3.2	 The	Meaning	of	the	“Political”
Commission officials did not feel constrained in conveying their ideological beliefs. Fewer than two per cent 
(N=34) refused to answer one or both questions, which is the same number as those who did not disclose 
their year of birth and twice as many than those not confessing their gender (N=17). It is possible that we 
helped respondents along by describing the ideological dimensions as “philosophical views or stances”. A 
more plausible explanation is that Commission officials are quite capable of distinguishing between philo-
sophical core values and party politics. The former is accepted and valued as input in the job; the latter’s 
influence is much rarer and much more contested.
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We received a taste of the former in face-to-face interviews with senior managers. We asked 40 directors 
and director-generals how much they enjoy the political side of their work. Twenty-eight (i.e. 70 percent) 
say they like it very much, six “like it but have some reservations”, one person accepts it as “part of the job”, 
against just two people who do “not like it that much” and three people for whom “there is no political 
side”. Moreover, despite being reluctant to share the monopoly of legislative initiative with the European 
Parliament (68 per cent disagree, 24 per cent agree),14 middle and senior managers are generally respectful 
of the role played by Council and European Parliament. Of 116 individuals in face-to-face interviews, 86 per 
cent disagree with the statement that the “European Parliament and/or the Council of Ministers too often 
interfere with the work of the European Commission” while 11 per cent agree. As Bauer and Ege (2011: 25) 
summarize, “Commission officials perfectly fall into the conceptual category of “image II” bureaucrats, i.e. 
demonstrating a clear ability to distinguish between a power-based and a policy-based understanding of 
political work” (see also Aberbach et al. 1981).
Engagement in party politics is a different matter. While we did not ask officials which party they voted for 
in the last elections or whether they are members of a party, we asked them whether party affiliation was 
an important basis of informal networking in the Commission. Party affiliation was flagged in fourth place 
among six options. Eighteen per cent ticked it as first or second-most important base; it was preceded by 
personal connections in the workplace (83 per cent), same nationality (49 per cent), and same language 
group (20 per cent), but beat shared educational background (13 per cent), and shared regional identity 
such as Nordic or Mediterranean (10 per cent).15
The minor role of partisanship is corroborated in face-to-face interviews with 116 senior and middle man-
agers. When asked directly about party membership, 85 per cent claim they have never been member of 
a party and only nine per cent say to be active or passive members.16 This appears to be much lower than 
in many national administrations (Bauer/Ege 2011).17 Table 6 reports on two questions about the relative 
role of party affiliation in Commission work. Party politics is presumed to be more important for cabinet 
members than for other officials, but the overall perception is that party affiliation does not matter a great 
deal. 
14 Middle management and senior officials from the online survey. Among junior officials, there is a somewhat greater 
willingness to share the legislative monopoly with the European Parliament (52 per cent disagree, and 37 per cent 
agree).
15 Middle and senior management in the online survey (n=228).
16 The question reads: “If you don’t mind us asking, do you belong to a political party?” with the following response 
options: 
No, never.
In the past, not anymore.
Yes, but I am not active.
Yes, and I am still active.
 
Our team argued long about the wisdom of including a question that was perceived to be very sensitive, but of ran-
domly selected interviewees only two people (1.7 per cent) chose not to respond. Perhaps the perceived sensitiv-
ity of partisanship for bureaucrats is more in the minds of political scientists than of bureaucrats.
17 Hard comparative evidence is sketchy. Bauer and Ege refer to a 2005 study of German top officials, where 48.5 per 
cent of interviewed German top officials reported to be a member of a political party.
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Table	6:	The	Role	of	Partisanship
How	important	is	the	party	
affiliation	or	party	sympathy	of	
officials	in	the	Commission?
How	important	is	party	
affiliation	for	cabinet	
members?
Party	affiliation	is	very	important 0.9 4.3
It	is	important 3.4 15.5
Sometimes	it	plays	a	role,	sometimes	not 20.7 38.8
It	is	not	very	important 46.6 20.7
It does not play any role at all 25.0 8.6
Don’t	know/	refuse	to	say 3.5 20.2
Note: Percentages. 116 respondents of middle and senior management (92 per cent are from EU-15).
Since the association between the two items is quite high,18 they can be combined in a factor “perception 
of party politicization”. Four factors are significant predictors of perceived party politicization. First, heads 
of unit are more likely than directors or director-generals to believe party affiliation is important. Second, 
people on the economic right are more likely to report politicization. This is consistent with the view that 
the pro-market-bias in the treaties requires center-left partisan mobilization to push through a market-
correcting agenda; market liberals enjoy the structural advantage of having their preferences built into 
the rules (Scharpf 2010). Third, officials from countries with a tradition of politicized administrations are 
more likely to find politicization in the Commission.19 Our evidence does not enable us to settle whether 
they simply project experience from their home country onto the Commission, or whether officials from 
countries with politicized civil services are more exposed to politicization in the Commission. The first 
would suggest that perceptions rule experience, and the second that experience in the Commission could 
be nationally specific. 
Fourth, the longer ago officials joined the Commission, the more likely they perceive party politicization. 
Disaggregating our sample in three groups – officials recruited during or before the Delors presidency 
(before 1995); officials recruited in the interregnum between Delors and Barroso (1995-2004); officials 
who entered during the Barroso presidency (2005 onwards) – sheds sharp light on this: the first group is 
three times more likely to perceive politicization than the third group, with the second group in the middle. 
This may reflect a tension between rapidly declining politicization in the Commission and people’s capacity 
to update their views. Delors recruits entered a highly politicized institution, but this context was altered 
by subsequent reforms. The current Commission bureaucracy is not free of party (and national) politics, 
but its daily operation and personnel policy are much less affected by it than before (Bauer/Ege 2011). 
However, updating political beliefs with new experiences happens slowly. 
18 Pearson correlation is 0.34 (n=100).
19 Politicization scores developed by Balint et al. (2008) for the fifteen EU countries. The additive index uses existing 
formal organizational rules, adding up seven dichotomous items. Each item is coded as “1” (i.e. politicized) if the 
condition in the brackets is satisfied. 1. Senior staff is usually recruited from the administration itself (no); 2. Senior 
staff is recruited through formal procedures prior to the appointment (no); 3. Senior staff can be dismissed by the 
minister without cause (yes); 4. Senior staff can be replaced when the government changes (yes); 5. The incumbent 
minister can appoint senior staff (yes); 6. A formalized cabinet system exists (yes); 7. The appointment of cabinet 
staff is formalized (no). Greece is most politicized and Britain least (Bauer/Ege 2011).
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4. Commission Officials and Policy Scope
The theory of bureaucratic politics predicts that bureaucrats prefer to expand policy competences or bud-
gets to enhance their status and power, and support expansion of their particular policy field more than 
others (Calvert et al. 1989; Niskanen 1994; Pollack 2003; Franchino 2007). We examine this argument in 
two steps, first by asking whether there is a general tendency to shift policy authority to the European 
Union, and second by investigating whether there is a specific tendency to fight for their policy corner. The 
evidence supporting these two bureaucratic arguments is weak. Commission officials’ attitudes on policy 
scope in general, and on the kind of policies that should be centralized are guided by ideology and EU 
governance views rather than by career interests.
Commission officials were asked to evaluate both the actual and desirable distribution of authority be-
tween member states and the EU on eleven policies: 
“We	are	interested	in	your	views	on	the	distribution	of	authority	between	member	states	and	the	EU	
on a range of policies. 
Please	start	by	giving	us	your	assessment	of	the	actual	distribution	in	2008.	Where	is	each	policy	•	
decided?
Where	should	this	policy	be	decided?”	•	
Respondents were prompted to select a position on an eleven-point scale from 0 (exclusively national/sub-
national) to 10 (exclusively EU). By subtracting actual from desirable policy we get a read on Commission 
officials’ attitude towards the status quo. Positive values indicate a desire for centralization and negative 
values for decentralization. Foreign & security policy and asylum & immigration policies lead the list. The 
smallest shifts are desired for competition, trade and regional policy. Interestingly, officials want to roll 
back centralization in agriculture.   
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Table	7:	Desired	Shifts	in	EU	Authority	in	Eleven	Policy	Fields
Actual 
policy 
scope
Desired 
policy 
scope
Desired 
shift in 
central-
ization
Desired 
rank-
ing of 
policies
Senior 
officials
Other Men Women EU-15 EU-12
EU Authority                      Mean
                                               St. Dev.
5.42
(1.22)
7.00
(1.30)
6.8
(1.37)
7.0
(1.30)
7.01
(1.27)
7.00
(1.38)
7.0
(1.30)
6.9
(1.34)
1.Competition
2. Trade
3. Agriculture
4. Environment
5. Regional development
6. Development
7. Energy
8. Asylum & immigration
9. Police & judicial cooperation
10. Foreign & security
11. Social policy
8.0
8.0
7.7
6.2
5.2
5.1
4.9
4.1
4.0
3.4
3.2
8.3
8.4
6.9
7.7
5.7
6.7
7.6
7.1
6.5
7.0
5.0
+0.3
+0.4
–0.8
+1.5
+0.5
+1.6
+2.7
+3.0
+2.5
+3.6
+1.8
2
1
7
3
10
8
4
5
9
6
11
7.4*
6.4**
4.6*
7.8*
7.1**
5.1*
6.8*
7.1*
7.1*
6.8*
5.6**
7.1*
7.1**
6.0**
6.8*
6.7**
Note: differences of means tests, and t-tests reported whereby *significant at .05 level; ** significant at 0.01 level. Only differences 
that are significant are reported.
4.1	 Centralization	Across	the	Board?
European Commission officials want more EU authority by an average of 1.58 on an eleven-point scale, 
which is a shift of 14 per cent. That is consistent with the most basic prediction of bureaucratic politics. 
However, there is no blanket desire for more Europe. Desired change appears highest for policies that are 
least centralized, though this is not a consistent trend. Social policy –  perceived to be the most decentral-
ized – is not on the Commission officials’ top centralization list, and the three most centralized policies 
(competition, trade, agriculture) are assessed very differently. At the individual level, there is even greater 
variation. Correlations between actual and desired scope range between -0.36 and -0.51 (depending on 
the subcategory). These are negative, suggesting that officials generally want greater shifts for the most 
decentralized policies, but they are also moderate, suggesting that officials have divergent views and use 
more discriminating criteria than an across-board “power-maximization” frame. 
Men are not more inclined to shift authority to the EU than women, and junior not more than senior of-
ficials. However, junior officials are keener on centralizing environment, foreign & security, or social policy, 
and men are more inclined to roll back EU agricultural policy, and more enthusiastic about centralizing 
foreign & security. In bivariate analysis, EU-12 officials appear no more or less inclined to shift EU authority 
than their EU-15 colleagues. However, they are less likely to centralize asylum & immigration or foreign & 
security, the top two policies in demand for centralization. This is balanced by the fact that they are more 
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in favor of EU regional policy than their EU-15 colleagues. What emerges is a qualified picture, which sug-
gests that the utilitarian argument that bureaucrats support bureau-maximizing strategies needs more 
scrutiny.
In a multivariate analysis of variation in overall desired policy scope, beliefs and ideology are more power-
ful than nationality and DG location (see appendix). 
EU governance views. • By far the most powerful predictor of how much centralization officials want 
is whether they are state-centrist or supranationalist. All other things equal, a state-centrist’s optimal 
level of centralization is 0.69 points lower than that of an institutional pragmatist and 1.24 points lower 
than a supranationalist‘s ideal point on a scale of 11.
Ideology.•  Socially liberal officials are more in favor of centralization than conservatives, and left-wing 
officials also tend to be more in favor than those on the economic right. These effects are robust 
even when we control for EU governance type. In other words, the fact that state-centrists tend to be 
market-liberal and supranationalists tend to be on the left does not swallow the independent effect of 
economic philosophy on desired policy centralization.  
Religion and state building.•  Officials from protestant countries are less likely to support centralization. 
This echoes a deeply engrained suspicion against supranational authority, anchored in the intertwined 
history of protestantism and state building in Northern and Central Europe (Rokkan/Urwin 1983). 
Country size.•  Officials from smaller countries are more in favor of centralizing authority, which is 
consistent with a public good argument. More targeted national utility factors are weak: officials from 
trading nations are not more in favor of centralization, nor are net beneficiaries of the EU budget or 
its structural funds, or countries with lower governance efficacy. 
East vs. West. • EU-12 officials are less likely to support centralization – an effect that cannot be reduced 
to ideology, EU governance, gender, or country characteristics.
Core activity. • External DGs (trade, Relex, development, enlargement) are more likely to support cen-
tralization than the average official. They are the only functional group standing out: there are no 
systematic differences for the other four types of DGs. Nor are there significant differences across 
technical and non-technical DGs, power DGs and others, or market-correcting and market-enhancing 
DGs. 
In explaining variation on the general desire for EU policy scope, DG location is weak. However, disaggre-
gating policy scope into meaningful policy families reveals a more differentiated picture. Table 8 compares 
average desired scope for market-enhancing policies (competition, trade), market-correcting policies (envi-
ronment, development, regional development, social policy), and security policies (asylum & immigration, 
police & justice, foreign & security) across types of DGs. 
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Table	8:	Desired	Policy	Scope	Disaggregated	by	Policy	Family
All policies Market-enhancing 
policies
Market-correcting 
policies
Security policies
Commission 
[St.Dev.]
                  7.00
                  [1.30]
                   8.39
                  [1.48]
                  6.30
                  [1.53]
                   6.83
                    [1.94]
Market-enhancing DGs
Market-correcting DGs
           ↔ 6.9
           ↔ 7.0
             ↑ 8.5
           ↔ 8.3
         ↓↓ 6.0
          ↔ 6.3
           ↔ 6.8
           ↔ 6.8
Spending DGs
Regulatory DGs
Legislative DGs
Internal DGs
External DGs
           ↔ 7.0
           ↔ 6.9
           ↔ 7.0
           ↔ 7.1
     ↑↑↑ 7.4
             ↓ 8.3
           ↔ 8.4
           ↔ 8.3
           ↔ 8.4
     ↑↑↑ 8.9
          ↔ 6.3
     ↓↓↓ 6.1
          ↔ 6.3
          ↔ 6.4
         ↑↑ 6.6
           ↔ 6.9
           ↔ 6.8
         ↓↓ 6.6
           ↔ 6.9
     ↑↑↑ 7.3
State-centrists
Institutional pragmatists
Supranationalists
     ↓↓↓ 6.2
         ↓↓ 6.9
     ↑↑↑ 7.4
     ↓↓↓ 7.9
           ↔ 8.3
     ↑↑↑ 8.7
     ↓↓↓ 5.5
             ↓ 6.2
     ↑↑↑ 6.7
     ↓↓↓ 5.8
         ↓↓ 6.6
     ↑↑↑       7.4  
Note: Averages for each subgroup. ↑↑↑ or ↓↓↓ indicate significance levels of t-tests on whether the mean for officials in a group 
is significantly different from the average for officials outside that group. ↑↑↑ or ↓↓↓ = <.001; ↑↑ or ↓↓ = <.01;↑ or ↓ = 
<.05; and ↔ = no significant difference.
Legend: All policies = all eleven policies (scope); Market-Enhancing policies = competition, trade; Market-correcting policies 
= environment, regional development, development, social policy; Security policies = asylum & immigration, police & justice 
cooperation, foreign & security policy.
Commission officials’ wish for EU authority is selective and explicable in terms of DG location. Grouping 
DGs by their policy principles produces intelligible differences: officials in market-enhancing DGs want 
to bolster EU authority in competition and trade much more than their colleagues in other DGs, and are 
less keen on EU authority in market-correcting policies. Officials in market-correcting DGs lean in the 
other direction, though they are less distinctive as a group than their colleagues in market-enhancing DGs. 
Selective centralization (or decentralization) is also apparent when DGs are grouped by core activity, with 
regulatory DGs harboring the most reluctant supporters of EU authority in market-correcting policies and 
spending DGs the most reluctant supporters of market-enhancing EU policies. As expected, officials in 
internal and legislative DGs do not have distinctive preferences on these ideological policy groupings. 
There is one exception to the measured and selective preferences of Commission officials: external DGs 
favor EU centralization across the board, and as we have seen above, this preference cannot be explained 
away in terms of their EU governance views, ideology or nationality.  
4.2	 Bureau-maximization?
The evidence above casts doubt on the assumption that Commission officials have a general desire for 
greater EU authority. They are measured and explicable in their preferences. However, is it not possible 
that officials promote their policy corner rather than Commission authority in general? Would this not 
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be consistent with the fact that the Commission is a deeply compartmentalized institution? Do they? 
The short answer is: partially. Table 9 reports independent means t-tests comparing desired EU authority 
between the DG “owning” the policy and all others. One-tailed tests are reported here because the expec-
tation is that officials from the DG that owns the policy should be more enthusiastic about EU authority 
than officials from other DGs. 
Table	9:	Does	Bureaucratic	Politics	Work?	
Policy                                                                                                   Desired EU authority in policy field
Sample size Owner-DG Others Significance 
(one-tailed)
Trade
Competition*
Agriculture
Social policy
Regional development
Environment
Foreign & security policy
Asylum & immigration
Police & judicial cooperation
47
53
93
70
59
81
65
50
50
9.5
8.1
7.7
5.3
6.0
7.8
7.6
7.5
6.5
8.4
8.3
6.9
5.0
5.7
7.7
6.9
7.0
6.5
.000
.279 
.000
.158
.064
.414
.000
.057
.426
Note: desired EU authority on a 0-10 scale with 0 (exclusively national/ subnational) to 10 (exclusively EU). Differences of means 
significant at .001 level are bolded.
* With respect to competition policy, officials in the owner-DG tend to be less in favor of centralization than officials outside the DG. 
The reported t-test parameter is two-tailed.
We test nine policies that are commonly identified with one DG and for which we have statistically mean-
ingful samples: competition, trade, agriculture, social policy, regional policy, environment, justice & police 
cooperation, asylum policy, and foreign & defense policy.20 Three of the nine policies conform to the ex-
pectation (trade, agriculture, foreign & security). None other reaches significance at the 0.05 level.21 One 
policy goes in the opposite direction: officials in DG competition lean towards less EU authority for their 
policy field than officials outside their DG. The difference is not significant, but it lends added credence to 
the conclusion that our evidence provides hardly a ringing endorsement of bureaucratic politics!  
20 Testing is constrained by the limited sample size of DGs, by the fact that policies may be fragmented across sev-
eral DGs (or parts of DGs), or that policies are diverse with respect to the appropriate balance of national/ EU 
authority.
21 On July 1, 2010, the former DG for Justice, Freedom and Security was partitioned into two DGs, one for home af-
fairs (DG Home), which deals with immigration and asylum, and one for justice and fundamental rights (DG Justice), 
which deals with citizenship and judicial cooperation. Our survey was conducted before the split and so we use the 
same home DG for asylum & immigration policy and for police & judicial cooperation.
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5. Conclusion
This paper surveys core beliefs of Commission officials: their basic conceptions of EU governance, and their 
political ideology. It then examines how these shape their views on politics and the allocation of authority 
in EU policy making. We find considerable variation and substantial structure, and stake out positions on 
some intense debates involving the institution. 
The European Commission has sometimes been portrayed as hungry for a supranational Europe with the 
Commission in the driver’s seat. We find limited evidence of this. The party of the willing is a minority of 
36 per cent. They want the College of Commissioners to be the government of Europe and do not want 
member states to be the central pillars. They co-habitate with 13.3 per cent state-centrists, who want the 
opposite, and with nearly 30 per cent institutional pragmatists who believe that neither the College of 
Commissioners nor the member states should be the kernel of EU government. Some 20 per cent avoid 
taking position. 
National background is powerful in distinguishing state-centrists from supranationalists, while DG location 
helps explain who the institutional pragmatists are. State-centrists are most likely to hail from countries 
with limited multilevel governance, larger populations, and Protestant state churches, and they are more 
likely to be former national civil servants. Supranationalists come from countries with multilevel gover-
nance, smaller countries, countries with less governance effectiveness, and non-Protestant countries. The 
types are not distinctive in age, seniority, length of service, or transnational experience, but they are dif-
ferent in gender (supranationalism is disproportionately male) and ideology (supranationalists are more 
leftwing and more socially liberal than state-centrists). State-centrists and supranationalists are in many 
ways each other’s alter ego. Institutional pragmatists stand apart from both groups – not so much in terms 
of national background, but on account of their professional profile: they work in policy DGs where shared 
technical knowledge reduces institutional power struggles. Their motivational core is consistent with this. 
They came to Brussels for primarily a-political reasons: to work on a policy problem, to be in an interna-
tional environment, or for family reasons. 
While these three types have their differences on the future balance among Commission, member states 
and Parliament, their disagreement is bounded. Europe is desirable and a source of motivation for all. 
They tend to agree that a) the Commission should have power of initiative; b) Commission officials should 
be watchful of national influence; and c) officials should be loyal to the political positions of the College. 
However, state-centrists are pro-management and others are much less; institutional pragmatists do not 
want to choose between Commission and member states as sources of authority; supranationalists are 
worried about geographical balancing and others are much less. Supranationalists may be followers of 
Monnet, Hallstein, or Delors, and institutional pragmatists may appreciate Haas’ hybrid form of gover-
nance, but state-centrists in the Commission are not disciples of de Gaulle, Thatcher, or Klaus.
The European Commission has been accused of being neoliberal, and it has been charged of plotting so-
cialism. Neither is true. European Commission officials are distinctly centrist on the economic left/right, 
albeit leaning slightly to the right. They are a fair echo of European societies, at least in the EU-15. Officials 
from the EU-12 are more market-liberal than their societies, but that does not make them neo-liberal. The 
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Commission is more distinctive on the social liberal/conservative dimension, where officials display the 
liberal bend to be expected of highly educated, internationally inclined, mobile, and prosperous public 
sector professionals. 
The distribution of ideology is far from random across services. Policy making is about the allocation of val-
ues, and the values that the Commission allocates vary from policy to policy. It is striking that the values of 
the employees vary in tandem. Market-correcting DGs attract officials sympathetic to an active role for gov-
ernment, and market-enhancing DGs appeal to market liberals. Services that disburse money appeal more 
to social-democrats, and regulatory services are economically conservative. On economic ideology, DG 
location is a surer predictor than nationality. There is only one exception: EU-12 officials are more market-
liberal than EU-15 officials. On social ideology, the differences are more a matter of personal demographics 
and less of institutional context. There is again one exception: EU-12 officials are more conservative than 
EU-15 officials.
The European Commission is a test case for bureaucratic politics theory which predicts that bureaucrats 
seek to maximize power. The evidence supporting the thesis is mixed. European Commission officials do 
want, in the aggregate, more EU authority in the eleven policy areas that we asked them to evaluate. 
The desired shift is significant but hardly radical: an average of 1.6 on an 11-point scale (from 5.4 to 7). 
There is significant variation both across officials and across policies. EU governance views and ideology 
provide strong cues for Commission officials in steering their general preference on whether policy author-
ity should be centralized at EU level or decentralized to national and subnational government. National 
interest (small countries want more EU authority) and national socialization (Protestant countries want 
less) help too, but only secondarily. DG location explains which policies Commission officials would like to 
centralize, and which ones not. The desire to centralize is selective and measured; it seems to be driven 
by reason and values rather than some gut reaction to maximize Commission power. But if DG location 
explains variation on particular policies, does this conceal a tendency for officials to defend their policy 
corner – over and above that of their colleagues? The answer is: only partially. On the basis of our data, we 
conclude that the pertinence of the bureaucratic politics argument has been overrated.
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Appendix: Multivariate Analyses
Table	A:	Explaining	Perceptions	of	Politicization	in	the	Commission
B std.error p-value
Party membership 0.274 0.297 0.358
Left/right ideology 0.110 0.050 0.030
Current position -0.367 0.204 0.076
Delors recruit 0.567 0.310 0.071
Intermezzo recruit 0.237 0.365 0.517
National politicization 0.099 0.055 0.077
Constant -1.000 0.589 0.093
R2
Adj. R2
.164
.107
Note: n=100; party membership: a value of 1 when the official has been a member of a political party (self-reporting); current position: 
1 if a director or director-general, and 0 if a head of unit; national politicization: see note 18 for details on operationalization.
Table	B:	Explaining	Variation	in	General	Desire	for	EU	Policy	Scope
B std.error p-value
Current position -0.209 0.127 0.101
Gender 0.003 0.072 0.972
EU-12 -0.279 0.128 0.030
Supranationalists 1.157 0.109 0.000
Institutional pragmatists 0.674 0.111 0.000
Others (fence-sitters) 0.819 0.118 0.000
Left/right ideology -0.033 0.018 0.058
Liberal/conservative ideology -0.031 0.014 0.025
Country size -0.003 0.000 0.007
Protestantism -0.435 0.175 0.013
Governance efficacy -0.153 0.103 0.137
Multilevel governance 0.001 0.005 0.809
Spending DGs 0.039 0.086 0.648
Regulatory DGs -0.038 0.098 0.701
Legislative DGs -0.108 0.104 0.296
Internal DGs 0.041 0.129 0.750
External DGs 0.300 0.122 0.014
Constant 6.955 .237 0.000
R2
Adj. R2
.137
.126
Note: n=1678; current position: same operationalization as in table A; gender, EU-12, supranationalist, institutional pragmatist, others, 
left/right, liberal/conservative, country size, governance efficacy, multilevel governance: see Hooghe (2012) for operationalization; 
Protestantism: see note 3 for detailed operationalization. DGs: see note 11 for details on operationalization.
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